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to the Lisbon Treaty. 5 According to the Manifesto, subsidiarity must be thoroughly justified in accordance with Protocol no 2 and applied separately in relation to every instrument and each part of that instrument. The proposition of an EU procedural criminal law measure must always be preceded by an extensive evaluation that weighs all circumstances, takes into account all alternative courses of action and presents serious substantive arguments to defend compliance with the subsidiarity principle. This justification-based and procedural approach to subsidiarity is to be welcomed and I therefore intend to adopt this approach throughout the analysis in this article. 6 Having briefly accounted for the link to the Manifesto, I will explain the scope of the examination. This article analyses the EU's competence to harmonize domestic criminal procedural laws 7 as enshrined in Article 82(2) TFEU:
'…To the extent necessary to facilitate mutual recognition of judgments and judicial decisions and police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters having a cross-border dimension, the European Parliament and the Council may, … establish minimum rules. Such rules shall take into account the differences between the legal traditions and systems of the Member States.
They shall concern:
(a) mutual admissibility of evidence between Member States; (b) the rights of individuals in criminal procedure;
(c) the rights of victims of crime…'
It could be queried why subsidiarity should be examined when analysing legislation adopted under Article 82 (2) TFEU. First, it is clear that subsidiarity applies to all EU legislation where the competence for the EU is not exclusive. 8 In addition, I believe that subsidiarity permeates the whole design of Article 82(2) TFEU since the exercise of the competence is conditioned upon the fact that the proposed legislative measures 'facilitate mutual recognition' in criminal matters having a 'cross-border dimension'. The real issue in relation to harmonization of EU procedural criminal law is, therefore, whether cooperation should be 5 See Protocol (No 2) On the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality OJ [2010] C 83/206. 6 Manifesto (n 4) 432-433. 7 Fletcher, Gilmore and Lööf, however, employ the concept of 'forensic criminal procedure' instead of 'national criminal procedural rules' to define the rules involved; see Maria Fletcher, Bill Gilmore and Robin Lööf, EU Criminal Law and Justice (Edward Elgar 2008) 138. 8 See Article 5(3) TEU.
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limited to 'cross-border' cases. Since the EU must always, pursuant to the subsidiarity criterion, show that the issue to be regulated is of a transnational nature 9 , it seems that the 'cross-border dimension' criterion in Article 82(2) TFEU is superfluous. Given this, we must focus on the 'cross-border' criterion inherent in the subsidiarity principle as a limit to the exercise of EU competence under Article 82(2) TFEU.
The first section of the article examines the legitimate justification for EU action in the field of EU criminal procedure and the limits to their use. It argues for a narrow understanding of subsidiarity, suggesting that EU procedural criminal law legislation can only be directed at problems which are of a cross-border nature and cannot be dealt with by Member States. The second section analyses the legality of the Victims Directive 10 on the basis of the subsidiarity principle. It sustains that the proposed Victims Directive can be criticised on subsidiarity grounds as the directive fails to adequately account for the link between victim rights and the application of the principle of mutual recognition and since the directive fails to explain
properly the need to regulate local victim rights. The third part finally summarizes the findings and draws some broader reflections on the basis of the examination. It is argued that EU initiatives in procedural criminal law have not primarily been driven by the need to facilitate mutual recognition and free movement but rather motivated by a general concern to deliver a common European sense of justice.
II WHAT ARE THE LEGITIMATE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR HARMONIZATION OF EU PROCEDURAL CRIMINAL LAW?
This section accounts for three legitimate justifications for EU action under the subsidiarity principle; the cross-border argument, the mutual recognition justification and the free movement rationale, and their use for harmonization of national procedural criminal laws.
If subsidiarity is to act as a check on the EU legislator when envisaging harmonization of national procedural criminal law, there must be some objective standard against which subsidiarity can be assessed. In this regard, it is pertinent to review the Edinburgh guidelines which provide the most detailed substantive criteria as to how subsidiarity should be conceptualised. 12 These guidelines list three criteria; the cross-border criterion, the 'Treaty requirement' criterion and the 'clear benefits' criterion that must be taken into account in assessing the need for Union action. 13 I will start by considering the cross-border criterion since this is the primary rationale for Union action in the guidelines.
A The cross-border criterion
The cross-border criterion is one of the core justifications for Union harmonization under the Treaties. 14 The clearest cases in which the scale or effects of a certain problem require Union action are those involving 'transnational' elements. 15 The scope of Union competences both in the field of legislative action 16 and the application of the free movement rules 17 have normally, at least before the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty and the Court's recent rulings on EU citizenship 18 , depended on the need to show a cross-border aspect. EU action is justified where a problem affects more than one Member State at the same time and de-centralized decision-making by independent states cannot adequately promote the welfare of citizens 12 The Court of Justice of the European Union ('Court', 'Court of Justice') assumes that the Edinburgh guidelines (n 11), as they were previously codified by the Amsterdam Protocol (no 30) on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality [1997] because of various kinds of cross-border externalities or spill-overs. 19 There is a 'collective action' problem in this situation since costs to independent Member States' of regulating the problem is higher than the cost of common EU action. 20 Even though the cross-border nature of the problem does not automatically justify EU action, it provides a strong presumption for a right for the EU to act on the matter. If there is a truly transnational problem and Member
States cannot resolve that problem, the legitimacy for the Union to act in the matter does not seem to be disputed.
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Whilst the cross-border argument constitutes a legitimate justification for EU action under the subsidiarity principle, we must examine to what extent it can be used to harmonize national procedural criminal laws under Article 82(2) TFEU. Peers have argued that harmonization of national procedural criminal laws in Article 82(2) TFEU cannot be limited to matters which have a specific relationship with cross-border proceedings, like the EU's civil law powers.
The Treaty drafter intentionally chose a broader wording for the criminal law power, 'crossborder' dimension in Article 82(2) TFEU, than the wording of the civil law power in Article 81(1) TFEU, 'cross-border implications'. The civil-law power has always been interpreted to mean that there has to be a genuine element of two states involved. Furthermore, the EU's specific competence in Article 82(2) TFEU would be rendered meaningless if it could only be used in cross-border proceedings since Article 82(1) TFEU already sets out a power to regulate criminal proceedings with a purely cross-border nature. Moreover, the phrase 'cross-border' dimension also governs the scope of the EU's substantive criminal law powers in Article 83(1) TFEU and it is not plausible that this power was intended to be limited to cases where the offence has factual links to more than one Member State.
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Peers' argument is convincing from a systematic and linguistic perspective. It is surely correct that the wording of Article 82(2) TFEU does not require the EU legislator to limit legislation to cross-border proceedings. This being so, there is an added dimension to the competence question which Peers has not fully explored. This is the subsidiarity principle. Although a broad competence to regulate purely national procedural rules may exist 23 , it appears that Article 5(3) TEU severely restricts how this competence can be exercised. I argue that subsidiarity still requires the EU legislator to show that the national procedural rules to be 19 See Lee (n 15) for a general description of the application of subsidiarity to resolve collective action problems. 20 See Kumm (n 1) 513-515, 519-521, for the concept of 'collective action'. 21 Peers has, however, added another pragmatic argument to defend why harmonization of national criminal procedural rules cannot be limited to cross-border criminal proceedings.
Taking the example of evidence, he suggests that although rules on mutual admissibility of evidence must have a link to cross-border proceedings, it will be hard in practice to limit their impact to cross-border cases. Harmonization to ensure mutual admissibility cannot easily be restricted to cases which have a specific cross-border element since the evidence might be collected before it was clear that such an element was present. The point applies equally to the EU's powers as regards victims' and suspect's rights a fortiori because it would not be clear in the early stages of a proceeding whether there is a cross-border element or not. The suspects might all be in the country when the investigation commences, but then they might have moved at some stage in the proceedings of the investigation, at which point there is a cross-border element. This argument is clarified by a comparison to civil proceedings. Whilst it is very difficult to fix a date in criminal proceedings, the date is fixed in civil proceedings when you take the actual step of lodging the official documents before the courts. At that point, it is possible to determine whether there is a cross-border element. observes that all previous proposals on procedural rights of defendants followed this logic as they provided for certain minimum rights to be applicable in all criminal proceedings.
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The pragmatic argument for not limiting cooperation to cross-border cases were also endorsed in the discussions before the House of Lords' European Union Committee. It was argued that it would be impractical to limit minimum standards for criminal procedure to cross-border 
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implications and are needed to ensure the full application of mutual recognition regimes. 41 It even appeared that many Convention members had insisted that the exercise of EU competence should only be allowed in matters where this was justified by a cross-border dimension. Article 82(2) TFEU was specifically revised and the words 'criminal matters with a cross-border dimension' were added for this purpose. Having argued that subsidiarity limits the exercise of the EU's competence under Article 82(2) TFEU to regulation of cross-border proceedings, I move on to examine one of the most 41 Emphasis added to underline that the idea was to limit cooperation to 'cross-border' cases. 12 (32) usually employed reasons for EU action under Article 82(2) TFEU; the 'mutual recognition' justification.
B) Improvement of judicial cooperation and mutual recognition
Generally, it seems that a key rationale for efforts to harmonize domestic criminal procedures has been to improve international judicial co-operation. It has been argued that inter-governmental cooperation is seriously hampered by diverging systems of national procedural criminal law. 45 Mutual recognition is a key concept in this regard and harmonization is mentioned unconditionally in Article 82(2) TFEU as a tool to facilitate the development of the mutual recognition principle. 46 By reducing and approximating current differences between the various criminal procedural laws, it is envisaged that the Member
States will have more trust in other legal systems and therefore be more willing to mutually recognize judicial decisions.
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Harmonization is viewed as the solution to the mutual trust problems inherent in the present of mutual trust among the judicial authorities of the Member States. 50 Having said this, we must recognize that this argument has its limits as otherwise the EU would have an endless mandate to make all criminal procedural laws uniform. The most important one is that the EU legislator must be able to show that harmonization of procedural criminal laws actually will lead to positive consequences for the principle of mutual recognition. 51 The limits to the mutual recognition argument are further discussed in detail in section II (D).
The rationale for EU action for mutual recognition measures is, notwithstanding the limit that EU legislation must be shown to benefit mutual recognition regimes, compelling overall.
International judicial cooperation involves a clear-cut cross-border dimension and addresses a situation where normally Member States alone cannot enhance such cooperation. Given this, there is a case for EU action under the subsidiarity principle for traditional mutual recognition measures such as the European Arrest Warrant and for measures that clearly supports existing mutual recognition instruments. 52 Having accounted for the mutual recognition argument, we move on to consider whether the free movement argument could be used to justify harmonization of national criminal procedures.
C) Enhancing free movement within the EU
In addition to the transnational nature of the issue to be regulated 53 , the most common way of defending why EU action rather than Member State action on a matter is warranted is on the basis that it facilitates free movement. 54 The internal market justification is a wide one for the 14(32)
Article 114 TFEU suggesting that there are no constraints on Union action under the internal market paradigm.
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The internal market justification has also been important to defend the approximation of EU procedural criminal law. It has been suggested that such approximation is needed to ensure the exercise of the free movement of persons within the EU. The day-to-day life of people should be facilitated, and the difficulties with which citizens are confronted in cross-border litigation should be neutralized as far as possible. Access to the procedural rules is very difficult in cross-border litigation. Whilst individuals cannot expect to know and understand 25 different laws, everybody should have easy access to the rules of the game. Differences in national procedural rules reduce access to justice and affects legal certainty. For these reasons they are obstacles to the fundamental freedoms.
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The Court's case-law on the scope of the fundamental freedoms and victim rights supports a broad interpretation of EU competence to harmonize domestic criminal procedures. The
Cowan judgment is the leading ruling. This case was concerned with a British citizen, Cowan, who had, after being injured from an assault suffered by him at the exit of a metro station in Paris, applied for compensation from the French Trésor Public(Treasury) for this injury.
Cowan was, however, denied compensation because he did not satisfy the conditions for obtaining the compensation as he was neither resident in France or a national of a country which had entered into a reciprocal arrangement with France. Cowan argued that the French rules on obtaining compensation were discriminatory and prevented tourists from going freely to another Member State to receive services there, thus infringing Article 18 TFEU.
The Court held that the principle of equality precludes a Member State from making the award of a right to a person in a situation governed by Union law subject to the condition that he hold a residence permit or be a national of a country which has entered into a reciprocal agreement with that Member State. The Court also found that the prohibition of discrimination was applicable since Cowan's situation was governed by the rules on the freedom to provide services which includes the freedom for the recipients of services to go to another Member State in order to receive a service there and that tourists must be regarded as The Court concluded that the French rules on compensation were contrary to the prohibition of discrimination laid down in the Treaties. 57 On the basis of this ruling and if we assume that there is congruence between the scope of the fundamental freedoms and the scope of the EU's harmonization competence 58 , it seems that the EU legislator can also justify EU harmonization of domestic criminal procedures with reference to free movement concerns.
D Limits to the justifications for harmonization of EU procedural criminal law
Even if there are, as accounted for above, several justifications for EU action to harmonize domestic criminal procedures, there are also corresponding limits to the use of these justifications. The central limit to these justifications is, as discussed above, the need to ensure that EU legislation conforms to the subsidiarity principle. However, as Article 5(3) TEU offers little guidance as to how subsidiarity will act as a check on the exercise of EU competence, we must once again turn to the Edinburgh Guidelines to ascertain in what way subsidiarity sets down limits to EU competences. These guidelines suggest that the most important limit is to ask for evidence for substantiating the rationale for EU action. This approach is supported by the third criterion in the Edinburgh guidelines which require that it is substantiated that EU action, whether based on internal market foundations, mutual recognition rationales or the transnational nature of the problem, offer 'clear benefits' in The purpose here is to enquire whether the Commission correctly exercised its competence in conformity with the subsidiarity principle when it adopted the Victims Directive. First, I
explain and set out a test of legality to employ when examining the Victims Directive.
Secondly, it is discussed whether the proposal is adequately reasoned from a subsidiarity perspective. Thirdly, it is analysed whether there is 'relevant' evidence to justify compliance with subsidiarity.
A Test for legality
Above, we have generally discussed how subsidiarity limits the exercise of EU harmonization competence under Article 82(2) TFEU. Building on this, I will suggest a test to be used to control whether EU legislation adheres to the subsidiarity criterion. The suggested standard implies a test of checking firstly whether there is 'adequate' reasoning for the measure's compliance with the 'subsidiarity' criterion and secondly, whether the evidence is 'relevant' to substantiate conformity with said criterion. 82 On the basis of the Court's ruling in Kadi II 83 and Tetra Laval, 84 I suggest a test where the EU legislator must first articulate, at least one justification, which in theory is sufficient as basis for sustaining compliance with the subsidiarity principle. Since the subsidiarity criterion requires both a demonstration that the regulated problem has a cross-border dimension, by either obstructing or risks hampering the fundamental freedoms or frustrating the application of existing mutual recognition regimes, and that EU provide for 'clear benefits' in avoiding or remedying these problems, the EU legislator must offer a justification for both these conditions. 91 See joined cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C-595/10 P Commission and others v Kadi (n 83), paras 118-119, 124, 130; Case C-12/03 P Commission v Tetra Laval (n 84)para 39. For the application of the evidence standard, see Kadi II paras 151-162. What the Court does is to monitor whether any of the relevant reasons submitted, which in theory can support the decision in themselves, is supported by sufficient evidence (para 162). This is the same method that I am proposing to apply when testing whether EU procedural criminal legislation conforms to the subsidiarity principle. 92 evidence for the claim that divergences in national procedural rules hinder free movement is only sustained with reference to one study or article, this would be insufficient. Secondly, the invoked evidence needs to be of a reliable nature in order to pass the test. This means that the invoked evidence need to be in the nature of statistical studies, policy studies or scientific articles which provide more serious support for an argument. Such sources could for example be statistics from courts, questionnaires to individuals and Member States identifying and outlining the problems of specific mutual recognition regimes. 93 Having proposed a test of legality, the next section applies this test to the Victims Proposal.
B Is there adequate reasoning in the Victims Proposal to justify compliance with the subsidiarity principle?
The Commission has proposed three separate justifications for why the Victims Directive conforms to the subsidiarity criterion. Secondly, the Commission sustains that free movement concerns can justify harmonization of victim rights. Victims may not be subject to the same rights in their country of residence compared to their home country, or in a country where they temporarily travel or visit. This risks impeding the free movement of persons and services, which is one of the fundamental requirements for the good functioning of the internal market. 98 The right to not be discriminated as a victim in another Member States is, as already mentioned 99 , recognised by the Court of Justices' case-law as a right falling within the scope of the fundamental freedoms. In addition to having a right to non-discriminatory treatment as regards the possibilities of obtaining state compensation 100 , victims or close relatives to deceased EU citizens are also entitled to equal treatment as regards victims' compensation schemes for crimes committed outside the territory of the host state. Common minimum rules will thus lead to an increased confidence in the criminal justice systems of all Member States, which in turn should lead to more efficient judicial cooperation. 102 As discussed above, this is also a rationale that is well-defended by the relevant literature. 103 We also know from above that subsidiarity demands the EU legislator to explain how EU action offers 'clear benefits' in relation to Member State action. 104 In response to this , the Commission argues that the above offered justifications; the free movement rationale, the cross-border nature of victimisation and the need to strengthen existing mutual recognition measures, entails that EU action offers a significant added value compared to Member State action. Furthermore, action at EU level would produce clear benefits in terms of scale of the action since it will ensure that all needs of victims are addressed. EU action to assist Member States through practical measures will enable economies of scale to be achieved, for instance in relation to the development of training programmes, development and dissemination of information programmes. Action at EU level would also produce 'clear benefits' in terms of effectiveness of the action. Whilst some improvements on victims' rights have occurred since the adoption of the 2001 Framework Decision 105 , studies show that national implementing measures have not been sufficient to properly address victims' needs. New EU action will have greater enforcement mechanisms to ensure that legislation is in fact implemented and enable the deficits of previous legislation to be rectified. 106 The proposed legality test only requires that the EU legislator has suggested one justification which individually, on the basis of the Court's case-law and the literature, defends compliance with the cross-border criterion and the clear benefits criterion. Applying this test it seems, at face value, that the justifications in the Victims Proposal are legitimate to defend the need for EU action on victim rights. There are at least three rationales; the free movement aspect, the transnational nature of victimisation and the judicial cooperation argument which, pursuant to the scholarship and the Court's case-law, offers independent justifications for EU action.
Nevertheless, if we dig a bit deeper in the legislative background documents, it quickly becomes clear that the reasons stated for action do not justify the scope of the proposed action. In particular, it is not explained why the EU on the basis of the stated reasons should have a general right to regulate purely internal situations, i.e. situations where the victim is victimised in their own Member State and where the judicial proceedings take place in that Member State. 107 Whilst, transnational aspects of certain types of victimisation, free movement concerns and the need to facilitate mutual recognition can justify EU legislation on rights for cross-border victims, the EU's competence under Article 82(2) TFEU is, as discussed above 108 , limited to cross-border cases. The Commission's proposal exceeds this limit and regulates rights of all victims, regardless of whether they are victimised abroad or in their own Member State and regardless of whether the proceedings are conducted abroad or in the Member State where the victims is a citizen. 109 The essence of my criticism goes to the rationales for EU action; the free movement argument and the mutual recognition argument which are both based on the alleged cross-border aspects of victimisation. However, in cases where victimisation has no cross-implications, the logic for harmonization of local victim rights on the basis of free movement concerns and mutual recognition rationale fails. 110 Local victim rights are simply not needed for a mutual recognition regime to work or for the functioning of the fundamental freedoms. There is no movement involved and no implications for the EU's mutual recognition regimes in domestic proceedings. Even if there were a link between the regulation of victim rights in domestic proceedings and the functioning of the internal market or even though the regulation of local victim rights were to have implications for the application of the principle of mutual recognition, the Commission has failed to account for these alleged links. 111 Given this failure and the fact that it seems almost impossible to envisage any scenario where local victim rights would have any impact on the working of mutual recognition regimes or the fundamental freedoms, it appears that the reasoning fails the 'adequacy' standard set forth by the first part of the subsidiarity test. This is regrettable. It is obvious that the EU legislator could elaborate rules on victim rights and defence rights that were limited to cross-border cases. If the EU took responsibility for regulating cross-border rights, it could then be left to Member States to decide on whether these rights should be applied also to national victims and national defendants. Many Member States would of course ensure that similar rights apply also to national victims and defendants. But subsidiarity suggests that this should be a choice for Member States to make.
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C Is there relevant evidence in the Victims Proposal to justify compliance with subsidiarity?
Whilst it is sustained that the Victims Proposal does not meet the standards of adequate reasoning, it is for the sake of the argument appropriate to also analyse the Proposal on the basis of the second part of the subsidiarity test; the evidence criterion. Since the Commission has not submitted any evidence to sustain how the absence of victim rights in domestic proceedings entails an obstacle to the fundamental freedoms, I will only focus on the evidence 110 25 (32) for the Commission's mutual recognition argument. I will examine the legality on the basis of the proposed test for subsidiarity compliance, demanding that at least one of the justifications proposed is supported by sufficient and relevant evidence.
Returning to the Commission's mutual recognition rationale, this argument suggests that harmonization of victim rights in both domestic proceedings and cross-border proceedings are necessary to build mutual trust which, in turn, will lead to more efficient judicial cooperation.
How then is this claim substantiated? The Commission primarily refers to evidence from the consultation procedure 113 to support its reasoning. It asserts that the discussions in the consultation procedure showed that the way victims are treated is a strong indicator of the quality of justice systems in general. Working on minimum standards of victims' rights is therefore a powerful means to generally increasing faith in foreign judicial systems. judicial co-operation but the mutual trust it creates that will enhance such cooperation. This train of thought is, nevertheless, not convincing according to Mitsilegas. As approximation must first create mutual trust, and only then in the second stage facilitates judicial cooperation, it is too indirect to work as a ground for harmonization. It is also very difficult to show that procedural minimum guarantees for defendants benefits the workings of mutual recognition regimes. The concept of "mutual trust" is also too vague to be subject to judicial review. This would, however, run counter to the Court's settled case law, according to which the choice of legal basis for a measure may not depend simply on an institution's conviction as to the objective pursued, but must be based on objective factors which are amenable to judicial review. different procedural criminal laws to similar cases so that one set of rights apply in one state and another set of rights in another state. 127 Limiting the applicability of EU criminal procedure measures to cross-border cases would only be detrimental to the achievement of legal certainty and equality before the law and could lead to reverse discrimination. 128 A lack of EU-level minimum standards on victims' rights puts the quality of justice in the EU at a lower level than standards identified in international instruments and through case law from the European Court of Human Rights. In a common Area of Freedom, Security and Justice,
this cannot be accepted. 129 That justice is a major concern for the EU institutions when contemplating harmonization is witnessed by statements by high EU officials. Commissioner
Reding has stated that if you have minimum rules for the suspect in the course of the proceeding, you also need to have minimum rules for the victim in the course of the proceeding. That is the balance you must have in all justice systems between the perpetrator and the victim of the crime. 130 Director General Le Bail stated in a similar vein that the Victim's Directive will make sure that victims will receive the same minimum rights whether they are at home or abroad in another Member State.
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The remaining question is obviously whether the EU is competent to harmonize national procedural criminal laws on the sole basis that it promotes justice in the EU. strengthening an offender's rights will impair the effectiveness of the criminal justice system and reduce the chances of clearing up crimes.
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The subsidiarity principle precludes the EU legislator from substituting the fairness and justice of policy choices made by Member States. 135 Justice cannot, in itself, justify EU harmonization of national procedural criminal laws under Article 82(2) TFEU. The EU can only adopt measures in the field of EU procedural criminal law that cover a cross-border situation by, for example, supporting mutual recognition measures or promoting fundamental freedoms. This approach accepts reverse discrimination. Unless there is a cross-border situation, victims or suspects would have to accept the rules to which they are bound as nationals. This means that they will be treated differently depending on whether they are involved in a cross-border situation or not. 136 But this is, and always has always, the central way of delimiting EU competences in regulating the affairs of the Member States. 31 (32) face of the idea that decisions must be taken "as closely as possible to the citizens", enshrined in the preamble to the Treaties and Article 1(1) TEU. As recognised by Lang, once the EU claims to have a competence to provide for generally applicable rights, there are no longer any limits to EU competence. He notes that other EU initiatives providing for common minimum rights, such as the Charter of Fundamental Rights, contains limits to the applicability of the rights by declaring that they are only enforceable as against Member
States 'only when they are implementing Union law'. There is, however, no such caveat in the Victims Directive which means that the EU common minimum rights will apply and be enforced in cases which do not contain any EU element whatsoever. A crime victim in Member State A, subjected to a crime in Member State A, committed by an offender in Member State A, can invoke the EU right before their national court without the need to establish a movement by any party to Member State A and without the need for the offence to be related in any way to the EU. 
